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The Economic Consequences of the Brexit Vote 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On June 2016, the British people voted to leave the European Union. This unexpected 
result provides us with the opportunity to study the impact of the vote on the economy. 
We replicate the work done by Born et al. (2017) by applying the synthetic control 
methods to capture the effect of the vote on different economic variables: firstly on the 
GDP, later on its components, following the National Accounts. We find proof of an 
output loss of around 3%, which comes mainly from households consuming less, firms 
investing less and the British Government spending less. Regarding the balance of 
trade, we do not find significative changes neither on imports nor ir exports.  
  
Keywords: Brexit vote, European Union, synthetic control methods, counterfactual, 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Brexit vote is an exceptional opportunity for the field of economics to better 
understand the effects of unexpected macroeconomic shocks: a clear natural 
experiment. The referendum can be addressed as a comparative case study due to some 
particular features: first, the result of the vote broke every prediction, and thus, it was 
totally unexpected; second, it affected one country in particular, allowing us to compare 
it to neighbouring economies; third, it may help in the comprehension of the 
mechanisms that underlie the economics of disintegration.
1
 
2
  
To better understand the roots of the Brexit vote, we must go back some decades. After 
the Second World War, the necessity to build up a new future for Europe over the ruins 
of conflict brought along with it the proposal of the European Communities. For many 
decades, that political, economic and social project went from paper into reality by 
integrating the duty of most of the European countries in a common purpose. What was 
initially conceived as a global arena for debate and understanding soon evolved into the 
greatest and most advanced democratic integration experiment in history: the European 
Union.   
In the eve of the 2008 Great Recession, new countries becoming members of the 
European club gave the impression that the further integration into the European Union 
was almost inevitable. However, that belief was about to be dramatically shattered.   
The morning of the 24
th
 of June 2016, Europeans woke up and observed that, for the 
first time ever, the integration in the European Union (EU)
3
 was about to take the 
opposite direction that it used to: the British people had voted in a referendum to leave 
the EU 52 to 48%. That result shook the foundations of a project which was deemed 
beneficial for all back then.  
The United Kingdom`s membership to the EU had begun in 1973. Since then, the 
economic relationships of that country with its continental counterparts had 
exponentially risen. Although the UK chose not to join neither the Euro Monetary Area 
                                                             
1 Sampson, T. (2017). Brexit: the Economics of International Disintegration. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 31(4), pp. 163-184. 
2  
3 From this point on, we will refer to the European Union by its acronym in English: EU 
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to maintain its currency sovereignty, nor the Schengen Area
4
 to keep their border’s 
control, it did accept the European Single Market.
5
 Additionally, the country signed the 
Treaty of the EU in 1993, which gave rise to the political union.  
That process of integration with the neighbouring countries radically changed the 
economic framework of the United Kingdom. In the decades prior to the joining, the 
GDP per capita for that country in relative terms to the rest of Western European States 
had steadily declined from being around a 45% higher in 1950 to a 0% gap at the 
beginning of the 70s. The membership seemed a wise decision to take to reverse the 
economic decline. From that point on, the United Kingdom was able to catch up again 
with the biggest European economies.
6
 
There is not much study around the source of the benefits of joining the EU. Campos et 
al. (2019) estimated the net benefits for the UK to be 8.6% of GDP. This economic 
impulse might have come from some main channels, according to this very same article. 
On the one hand, the instant access –with almost no barriers– to millions of European 
consumers might point out to the benefits of a form of trade liberalization. On the other 
hand, the urgency to compete with other European companies might have led to an 
important increase in the productivity of British firms and workers. Other sources add to 
this list the financial integration, which allowed the mainly London-based industry to 
become a worldwide reference in its field.  
In any case, data from the economic relationship of the United Kingdom with its 
continental partners suggests a rapid and close integration from the 1970s on. By 2016, 
47,71% of the British exports were to EU States, while 54,91% of their imports came 
from the other side of the Channel. The balance of trade with EU countries yields a 
negative figure, which means that British companies and individuals import more 
products and services than they export. When it comes to the labour force, an estimated 
1,3 million UK nationals live in EU countries, while the UK hosts around 3,6 million 
Europeans. In terms of direct economic benefits of the membership, it must be noted 
that the United Kingdom received up to €7,1 billions in 2017 from EU institutions. This 
funds came primarily from the European Structural and Investment (ESI) funds and the 
                                                             
4 An area of 26 European countries in which passport and border controls are abolished 
5 A single market that guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour among the 
28 EU member states, created through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.  
6 (Campos, Coricelli, & Moretti, Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating the Benefits from 
Membership in the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method, 2014) 
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European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF). Moreover, the membership grants 
access to the European Investment Bank,
7
 which mobilised up to €5,4 billions per year 
in the period 2011-2017 to support UK-based projects and companies.  
It was in this context that the British people voted to leave the EU on 23
rd
 June 2016, 
hence beginning the process formally known as ‘Brexit’. The UK government under the 
newly designated Prime Minister Theresa May started the negotiations to determine the 
conditions under which the United Kingdom was about to leave the economic block. 
The result of the referendum was clear: leave as a loud wake-up call. However, the 
terms of the withdrawal from the EU had not been addressed by the voters. These would 
completely depend on the negotiations to be carried out.  
Right away, uncertainty about the near future of the country became an issue to be taken 
into account. The general opinion agreed that there was going to be an economic impact 
of the Brexit vote. The ‘Remain’ campaign had made the economy the central issue of 
their bet to win the referendum.
8
 Nevertheless, the softness of the goodness of fit would 
entirely depend on the negotiation path that the British government would take.  
Now, more than three years after, many of the predictions have not been fulfilled, while 
other unpredicted economic effects have arisen. This paper will firstly address the 
existence of any measurable economic impact of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom 
by replicating the seminal paper by Benjamin Born, Gernot J. Müller, Moritz Schularick 
and Petr Sedlácek: The Economic Consequences of the Brexit Vote (2017). The method 
to be followed will be that employed in that paper. The analysis will entirely rely on a 
data-driven approach by using the synthetic control method, an empirical 
macroeconomic technique initially proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015).  
This procedure will allow us to capture the estimated output gap derived from the Brexit 
vote. Up–front, we find that the British output has fallen by more than a 3% by 2018Q4 
with respect to the expected output under no vote. This loss would represent around 62 
billion pounds.  The robustness of the results will be tested via placebo effects. We will 
                                                             
7 The European non-profit financial lending institution, which does not get financiation from the EU 
Budget, but directly from financial markets. Its main purpose is to support EU based projects or 
companies which go along the main lines drafted by the EU (Integration and Social Cohesion) by giving 
favorable-terms loans  
8 See the webpage of the Stronger In Campaign: 
https://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts#oAui0RVdXTuSc8Kg.97 
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check whether there is any output loss for the countries that we compare the UK to, or if 
there is any loss for every other period from 2015 to 2017 that is not related to the vote 
itself.  
Once the output effect is addressed, the next step will be to dig deeper into the possible 
causes of the output loss. The fact that the Brexit has not yet been delivered makes this 
economic slowdown even more interesting for the macroeconomic field. According to 
Born et al. (2017), two main reasons may lie behind the slowdown: the uncertainty 
about the final result of the Brexit negotiations and the anticipation of the forward–
looking economic agents. In turn, we pose the hypothesis that those two drivers might 
already be affecting consumption and investment in the United Kingdom. 
The impact of the Brexit vote in the components of the GDP is approached in the 
extension in section 4. We apply the same synthetic control methods to the National 
Accounts’ components of the output: consumption, investment, public expenditure, 
exports and imports. We try to decompose the GDP so as to understand the variables 
that are pulling the output down at most. Through this technique, we obtain mixed 
results. While the approximations for consumption and public expenditure allow us to 
conclude that the Brexit vote is already negatively affecting those variables, goodness of 
fit is not good at all for the investment, exports or imports. However, we find some 
particular features of those series that are certainly interesting for the analysis to tackle. 
This will be explained in detail in section 4.  
We conclude the article with some final remarks in section 5.  
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2. The effect of the Brexit vote on the output 
2.1. Construction of the synthetic control 
 
As explained in the previous section, the Brexit vote poses a great opportunity to study 
the aggregate consequences of a sudden change in the macroeconomic prospects of the 
United Kingdom. To address the causal impact of the vote on the British output, 
however, we would need another economy to make the comparison with. The optimal 
case would be to compare the actual output in the UK with the hypothetic one, had the 
Brexit vote not happened. Unfortunately, only one of those time series is observed.  
The synthetic control method as proposed in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) jumps over that data problem by constructing a synthetic 
economy that resembles the evolution of the British output prior to the Brexit vote and 
is not affected by it: a counterfactual. For the analysis to be rigorous enough, the 
synthetic has to approximate the actual output as much as possible before the Brexit, so 
that the post-Brexit evolution of the synthetic can be trusted as a good approximation. 
The hypothesis behind this procedure is that the output of the United Kingdom would 
have behaved as the synthetic in the event of the Brexit vote not occurring. Hence, the 
difference between the two time-series –the actual output and the counterfactual– would 
yield the estimated impact of the Brexit vote on the economy, the deviation from the 
should be scenario attributable to the referendum. The counterfactual is built over data 
from other countries that are mostly similar to the United Kingdom and are not affected 
by the Brexit vote. We call those ‘donor pool countries’, or ‘donor countries’. 
To construct the synthetic control unit, we gather quarterly Real GDP data from 29 
donor countries and the UK,  from 1995Q1 to 2018Q4, a total of 96 quarters.
9
 
10
 
11
 The 
source of our data is the OECD Database. Then, we set the output for every country in 
1995Q1 as 1 and transform the data in relative terms to that initial value. We proceed 
this way because the output in relative terms has less variability than the absolute one, 
in such a way that the synthetic counterfactual will more precisely capture the evolution 
of the GDP for the UK. As the Brexit vote (our treatment) happened in the third quarter 
                                                             
9 Measured in 2010 Dollars to be able to compare between countries. 
10 The countries from the donor pool are enlisted in Table 1. 
11 In our analysis, we omit Slovenia from the donor pool because its information from 1995 is missing. 
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of 2016, the synthetic will be formed from data spanning from 1995Q1 to 2016Q2, for a 
total of 86 quarters.
 12
 We call this period the ‘pre-treatment’. We will define the synthetic 
control unit as a weighted average of the output of the countries in the donor pool for 
the pre-treatment period. The weights of that unit will be obtained by minimising the 
distance between the output of the United Kingdom and that of the synthetic economy 
as it is displayed below: 
(𝐗𝟏 − 𝐗𝟎𝐖
∗)′𝐕(𝐗𝟏 − 𝐗𝟎𝐖
∗)    
Where X1 is a 86 x 1 matrix comprising the output data for the UK, X0 is a 86 x 29 
matrix for the output data of the donor pool countries, W is the 29 x 1 matrix of weights 
for every donor country that we try to minimise and V is a 86 x 86  nonnegative 
diagonal matrix.
13
 It must be noted that the weights are subject to the following 
restriction: 
∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
29
𝑖=1
 
𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑖 , … , 𝑤28, 𝑤29 ≥ 0 
The country weights are obtained from an algorithm that calculates the optimal convex 
combination of the donor pool outputs that most closely approaches the output for the 
UK at each quarter of the sample. The results are displayed in the table below: 
Table 1: country weights for the synthetic counterfactual  
Australia <0.01 
 
Greece <0.01 
 
Netherlands <0.01 
 
Austria <0.01 
 
Hungary  0.18 
 
New Zealand <0.01 
 Belgium <0.01 
 
Iceland <0.01 
 
Norway  0.14 
 Canada  0.28 
 
Ireland  0.03 
 
Portugal  0.09 
 Chile <0.01 
 
 
Israel <0.01 
 
Slovak Republic <0.01 
 Czech Republic <0.01 
 
Italy <0.01 
 
Spain <0.01 
 Estonia  0.02 
 
Japan  0.20 
 
Sweden <0.01 
 Finland <0.01 
 
Korea <0.01 
 
Switzerland <0.01 
 France <0.01 
 
Luxembourg <0.01 
 
United States <0.01 
 Germany <0.01 
 
Mexico  0.02 
 
Table 1: country 
weights for the 
output 
 
 
                                                             
12 Actually, the Brexit vote happened on June, 23rd, at the end of the second quarter of 2016. However, 
for data purposes we set the vote to be carried out at the beginning of the third quarter of 2016. 
13 By following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), we will assign higher weights to those variables that 
have a higher predictive power on the UK output for the pre-treatment period. This V matrix will be 
obtained from a cross-validation routine, as in Abadie et al. (2015) 
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As it is observed, many of the countries have weights that are close to zero, while 
others, like Canada, Hungary, Japan or Norway more clearly resemble the UK 
economy. This could be an indicator that the weights are closely capturing the British 
output, given that the countries with the higher weights are very similar to the UK: they 
are industrialized Western economies which support free-trade but do not belong to the 
Euro–Monetary Area.14 Other minor contributions come from Estonia, Ireland, Mexico 
or Portugal. 
It must be noted that the synthetic has been constructed in two different ways. Firstly, 
we assume the entire period from 1995Q1 to 2016Q2 to be the pre–treatment and 
compute the optimal weights for the whole term. In this case, we do not include a 
validation period. In a second attempt, we divide the pre–treatment period in two sub–
periods: the ‘training’, lasting from 1995Q1 to 2005Q2, and the ‘validation’, from 
2005Q3 to the Brexit vote. Through this method, we compute the optimal weights in 
two steps. In the first place, the differences in outputs for the UK and the donor 
countries are minimized in the training period. As the name suggests, the algorithm is 
training itself to get the better possible goodness of fit. From this initial optimization 
problem, the optimal W* is obtained matching the pre–treatment values of the GDP for 
the United Kingdom with those of the donor pool countries over the training period and 
the optimal V* is obtained minimizing the mean square prediction error over the 
validation period. Second, we run a second optimization process to find the optimal W 
for the validation period, taking the optimal V* matrix computed in the previous step. 
This way, we get the best possible goodness of fit (or the minimum difference between 
outputs of treated– and untreated–countries) for the best possible weights. Nevertheless, 
this two steps method is not suitable when the volatility of the data is not regular along 
the series, because the second optimization would yield a poor goodness of fit for the 
non–appropiate previously optimized weights.15 Accordingly, for simplicity purposes, 
we will not include a validation period in subsequent calculus, as the differences in 
methods are not remarkable enough to balance out the problems with certain data series. 
Finally, we can now build our synthetic counterfactual by adding the GDP of all donor 
pool countries properly weighted using the estimated value of W.  
                                                             
14 Our results are similar to those in Born et al. (2017), pp.7, although with some differences probably 
due to the time range of the databases used. 
15 As we will face later on for the investment or the exports. 
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2.2. Estimation results 
The main results are displayed in graphs 1 and 2. In the first plot, both time series for 
the whole sample are represented. The goodness of fit of the counterfactual is very good 
for all the sample, with small differences in very few quarters. Nevertheless, after the 
Brexit vote, both series start clearly diverging, the observed output being consistently 
below the synthetic one. This would point out to the fact that, after the vote, the British 
economy has lagged behind its expected output levels, had the economy been unaltered 
by such a vote. This gap could be interpreted as the causal effect of the Brexit vote on 
the output of the UK, as there is no such a previous deviation.  
In the second graph, we focus on the 2015–2018 period to better appreciate the gap in 
outputs. The causal impact of the Brexit vote can be observed from the third and fourth 
quarters of 2016 on, some months after the referendum. The gap widens as time goes 
by, presumably until a Brexit agreement is reached and the uncertainty about the future 
situation of the British economy vanishes. It must be noticed that the output loss could 
be permanent. Arguably, when the uncertainty is resolved (both via an agreement or 
with a no–deal solution), the United Kingdom could return to the pre–Brexit vote 
growth path, what implies that the UK’s GDP would be permanently below the 
counterfactual. This could mean that even in the case of the UK finally not leaving the 
Graph 1: UK actual GDP and synthetic counterfactual relative to 1995Q1 
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European Union, the output gap would not close in years to come. Although the 
statistical significance analysis is difficult in causal inference, we include in the chart 
one standard deviation from each time series, represented by the shadowed grey area. 
We might conclude that the gap between the two outputs is significant provided that 
their shadowed areas do not overlap from 2017Q1 on.  
The estimated gaps are better understood if we have a glance at graph 3. In this third 
chart, we compute the gap between the observed and the synthetic outputs in percentage 
points. For the pre–treatment period, the gap oscilated between ± 1.5%, never 
exceeding those upper and lower bounds. Indeed, the mean value of the gap for that 
period was 0.00081%, nearly zero, while the standard deviation was 0.5998.  
After the Brexit vote, it is clearly observable a downward trend of the gap. From values 
close to zero in 2015, the mean gap multiplied by more than 2000, after the gap 
expanded up to a 3% in the last quarter of 2018, 2 times the maximum gap observed for 
1995–2016. The evolution of the gap in percentage points and in accumulated gross 
quantities is displayed in Table 2. 
 
Graph 2: UK actual GDP and synthetic counterfactual relative to 1995Q1 for the 2015-2018 
period 
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Graph 3: UK actual GDP and synthetic GDP gap 
 
In 2016, the referendum shock had hardly had any appreciable effect on the output. 
However, by the third quarter of 2017, approximately a year after the referendum, the 
output gap in the UK had already exceeded any previous gap since 1995, with a 44 
billion dollars loss,
16
 around 34.66 billion pounds, or 1.69 % of the British GDP. The 
economic downturn exacerbated in the following quarters: by the beginning of 2018 it 
                                                             
16 American billions equal to European milliards, or thousands of millions. The quantities noted here will 
be expressed in American billions. Also notice that, although measured at quarterly frequency, output 
loss is annualised. 
Table 2: output gaps Table 2: output gaps in percentage points and gross quantities 
Quarter % Period gap Quarter % Period gap 
2016–Q3 0.16 3995.375 2017–Q4 -2.16 -56540.159 
2016–Q4 -0.55 -14146.917 2018–Q1 -2.52 -65969.670 
2017–Q1 -0.64 -16579.189 2018–Q2 -2.91 -76306.070 
2017–Q2 -1.39 -36255.634 2018–Q3 -2.73 -72169.065 
2017–Q3 -1.69 -44155.149 2018–Q4 -3.01 -79654.514 
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had gone well over the 2.5% mark, and at the end of that very same year it reached a 
loss of 3%. For the last data available, the output gap is estimated to be over 79 billion 
dollars, slightly over the 62 billion pounds. This would amount to as much as 477 
million pounds per week.
17
 The 62 billion pounds loss corresponds to a £932 loss for 
each British national
18
 or £3263 for every family or household.
19
 It must be noted that 
this quantity significantly exceeds the famous misleading Vote Leave campaign 
promise of reallocating 350 million pounds from the EU weekly funding to the National 
Health Service.
20
 The accumulated loss by 2018Q4 would correspond to a 63% of the 
total budget allocated to the National Health Service for the 2018–2019 period,21 to 
approximately an 80% of all the budget dedicated to education, a 1.5 times the 
investment in defense or a 9.6% of the Total Managed Expenditure of the UK Budget 
for the 2019–2020 budget year.
22
 
The results obtained from this analysis are much more pessimistic than those set forth in 
Born et al. (2017). While they predicted a loss of 2% of the output by the end of 2018, 
our analysis raises that prediction to a 3%. The difference could come from the fact that 
when the authors of that paper estimated the effect of the Brexit vote there was still no 
data available for most of 2017 and 2018, and hence, their analysis could have 
undervalued the effect of the vote.  
 
2.3. Placebo testing 
Although there seems to be a breaking point after the Brexit vote, more tests must be 
carried out to check for statistical significance of the estimated loss. As a matter of fact, 
there are many variables that could have affected the final result of our estimation, other 
                                                             
17 Those values were computed by dividing the acummulated  estimated output loss in 2018-Q4 by the 
130 weeks that go from 2016-Q3 to 2018-Q4. 
18 Computed via the last available data on Total Population for 2018. See the World Bank Database.  
19 18,997 million families in 2017 according to the Office for National Statistics. See in: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/datasets/
familiesandhouseholdsfamiliesandhouseholds 
20 See the Vote Leave campaign ad in: https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:pen598xoz 
21 See the budget prospects for the NHS by period in: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/nhs-in-a-
nutshell/nhs-budget 
22 HM Treasury Budget 2018, pp.4. Available online in: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2202/Budget_2018_red_web.pdf 
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than the referendum itself. Following Abadie et al. (2010) (2015) and Born et al. (2017), 
some placebo tests will be conducted on the data used.  
Through these placebo experiments, we test the two main hypotheses that underlie the 
causal inference technique employed in the previous sections: that the Brexit vote does 
not affect other countries and that the change in the output trend happened in 2016Q3, 
indeed. In short, we try to confirm that the output specifically responded to the Brexit 
vote by checking that there was no effect on the output when no vote was held: across 
countries and across quarters. If this were the case, we could consistently assure that 
there was a causal effect of the referendum.  
In the first place, we would like to address the hypothesis of the Brexit vote not 
affecting the rest of donor pool countries. The synthetic control method rests over the 
assumption that the treatment does only affect the treated country, the United Kingdom. 
In this way, we suppose that the rest of countries are not affected by it. However, if this 
were not the case, the synthetic counterfactual could be biased.  
To apply the placebo test to our sample, we set each of the countries in the donor pool 
as the treated unit and run the algorithm that builds a synthetic counterfactual. The 
question that we are trying to answer is: did the output of the respective country change 
the trend in the third quarter of 2016? Once we obtain the 30 synthetic counterfactuals 
for the UK and the 29 control countries, we compute the gaps between the observed and 
the constructed outputs. The results are displayed in Graph 4 below, together with the 
previously obtained gap for the United Kingdom.  
For a better representation, only those countries whose mean square error prior to the 
vote is less than three times the error from the UK are included in the chart: 15 donor 
countries and the United Kingdom. The trends differ from country to country, but there 
is clear widening of the gap for the British output. While in the first half of 2016 the gap 
was around zero, and in the middle of the countries’ distribution, by the last quarter of 
2018 the gap for the United Kingdom was the most considerable. This downward trend 
of the output gap is not observed for the rest of the countries in the donor pool. 
Consequently, we could conclude that the countries we chose for the comparison are not 
affected by the Brexit vote, and comprise a good sample. There is no appreciable 
placebo effect for the countries. 
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Secondly, we would like to test whether the observed causal impact is attributable to the 
Brexit vote itself. For that purpose, some quarter–placebos will be fulfilled. The 
synthetic control method will be applied to the output by changing the treatment date 
for every third quarter between 2000Q3 and 2010Q3.  This way, we will obtain 15 
synthetic outputs where we assume that the Brexit vote hypothetically happened in 
those different quarters. The results for the third quarter of 2010, 5 year before the 
actual Brexit vote, are represented in the following chart.  
In this chart, we can observe that there is indeed a placebo effect for the time related 
synthetics. The black line represents the observed output for the United Kingdom, the 
red, the original synthetic control taking the third quarter of 2016 as the treatment 
period. The blue line depicts the  synthetic control that arises from varying the treatment 
period to 2010Q3. There is a significant gap between the counterfactual and the actual 
GDP for the 2010–2016 period. This would suggest that the in time placebos do not 
provide internal validity to the analysis, as we observe an output GDP when a fictional 
Brexit vote is applied. For the placebos to work, we would expect no gap no appear 
between 2010 and 2016. One placebo not working invalidates the internal validity test. 
Graph 4: Real GDP vs Synthetic GDP gaps across countries: Placebo effect analysis 
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3. The main drivers behind the economic downturn 
3.1. The uncertainty and anticipation effects 
 
Three years after the Brexit vote, no solution has been yet delivered by the British 
government. However, as shown is the previous section, the vote has already 
significantly impacted the output. The most likely reason for this would be the impact of 
uncertainty about the future economic condition of the UK on British households and 
firms.
23
 
24
 
Born et al. (2017) estimate the individual contribution of both uncertainty and 
anticipation effects to the output loss. They observe that uncertainty amounts to 1/3 of 
the loss, while the anticipation captures the rest of the gap, 2/3. These two effects are 
somewhat conflicting, but are happening together, though. Uncertainty seems to be 
affecting both the decisions to consume of households and to invest of firms. As they 
                                                             
23 (Blanchard, L`Huillier, & Lorenzoni, 2013) 
24 (Bloom, 2009) 
Graph 5: Synthetic outputs as placebos for the third quarter of 2010 
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can’t be sure about the final deal under which the UK will leave the European Union, 
they might be deciding to save a higher proportion of their income or profits. 
Anticipation is also changing the economic decisions in the United Kingdom. Forward–
looking agents might be aware of the pessimistic prospects for the following years, and 
they may be acting accordingly. On this matter, they might be playing the expenditure 
restraint card to be able to cope with future economic instability.  
Forward–looking economic agents –as they are assumed to be in the traditional 
academic literature– might be differently affected by the downgraded prospects. 
Additionally, the terms of the economic impact may also play a role in the output loss. 
Indeed, it must be differentiated between short– and long–term consequences.  
The Brexit vote has had some instant consequences that arose just after the voting 
recount. Firstly, the British pound sterling (GBP) plummeted in the following days as it 
is observed in the following exchange rates chart: it lost more than a 10% of its value. 
International pound holders sold millions of that currency in the markets due to the loss 
of confidence in the economic path that the country was about to take.  
 
This depreciation had some immediate impact in the consumption and investment 
decision of economic agents: exports cheapened, while imports got more expensive. 
Graph 6: British pound Sterling – US Dollar and British pound Sterling – Euro 
exchange rates Source: Reuters 
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This condition will be addressed in section 4.4. However, the decrease in the price of 
exports would be almost cancelled out by the rise in the price of intermediate inputs. 
This condition is the most likely culprit behind the investment. Investment will be more 
closely dealt in section 4.3. In addition, the depreciation provoked a significant rise in 
the inflation of the United Kingdom, which would in the following quarters 
considerably affect real wages and thus, consumption. This very last issue will be 
analysed in section 4.2. 
The long–term consequences of the Brexit vote are more difficult to estimate. Some 
research has been made about the future implications on trade and However, this 
particular issue is hard to present, given that no leave–deal has been yet negotiated. 
In the following sections, we apply the synthetic control method as previously has been 
employed for the GDP. We decompose the output in its main components following the 
National Accounts’ criteria: consumption, investment, public expenditure and balance 
of trade (exports and imports will be separately addressed). Through this approach, we 
try to estimate the individual contribution of each component to the output loss. 
Moreover, we look for the reasons behind it by revising some literature.  
 
3.2. Consumption 
 
Consumption has traditionally captured most of the national income of the United 
Kingdom.  British families’ consumption was 63.28% of the GDP in 2018Q1. Were 
households more prone to be affected by the economic uncertainty caused by the Brexit 
vote, then their consumption would have faced a significant slowdown for the quarters 
following the referendum. The instability of consumption under uncertainty shocks has 
for long been studied in the Economics field. Households usually react fastly about 
future pessimistic prospects by reducing their consumption and increasing the savings.  
The impact of the Brexit vote in the consumption will be estimated by replicating the 
synthetic control approach in section 3 of this article. For that purpose, we collect gross 
consumption data from 1995Q1 to 2018Q4 and for the same countries that we 
previously had. We set the value of consumption in 1995Q1 as 1 and transform the rest 
of the data in relative terms to that initial value. Again, this will allow us to obtain a 
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closer synthetic, as gross consumption is subject to more volatility. We will construct a 
synthetic British consumption series by minimizing the distance between the 
consumption for the UK and the donor pool countries for the 1995Q1—2016Q2 period. 
The process strictly follows the one more deeply explained for the output estimation.  
Table 3: country weights for the synthetic consumption 
Australia <0.01 
 
Greece <0.01 
 
Netherlands 0.275 
 
Austria <0.01 
 
Hungary 0.172 
 
New Zealand <0.01 
 
Belgium <0.01 
 
Iceland <0.01 
 
Norway <0.01 
 
Canada <0.01 
 
Ireland <0.01 
 
Portugal <0.01 
 
Chile <0.01 
 
Israel <0.01 
 
Slovak Republic <0.01 
 
Czech Republic  0.03 
 
 
Italy <0.01 
 
Spain <0.01 
 
Estonia  0.06 
 
Japan  0.03 
 
Sweden <0.01 
 
Finland <0.01 
 
Korea <0.01 
 
Switzerland <0.01 
 
France <0.01 
 
Luxembourg <0.01 
 
United States 0.375 
 
Germany <0.01 
 
Mexico  0.05 
 
  
Table 3: country weights for consumption 
Table 3 summarises the weights obtained from running the algorithm that selects the 
best composition of donor countries so as to minimize the differences in consumption 
for our sample. The results are again suitable for the United Kingdom: the countries 
with the highest weights are the United States, Netherlands and Hungary, all Western 
economies with similar patterns of consumption. There are also small contributions 
from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan or Mexico. We can observe that most of the 
economies replicate the United Kingdom in having their own currency and hence, 
independent monetary policy.   
As noted in section 3, the synthetic counterfactual for the consumption will be carried 
out in a single spell, treating the period that goes from 1995Q1 to 2016Q2 as a unique 
pre–treatment. We can build up the synthetic consumption by adding the weight for 
each country multiplied by its consumption data. 
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Both time series are plotted in chart 7 above. Although the goodness of fit between 
them is not as precise as it was for the output, the square error of the difference is still 
small enough to validate the estimation. The most problematic part is around 2010, 
where the synthetic doesn’t capture well the peaks in consumption. This problem could 
be due to both the economic crisis that struck Europe at that time and the monetary and 
fiscal policies that the British government took to mitigate its effects. However, an 
important divergence between the two series can be observable after the Brexit vote, in 
the right–hand side of the graph. This change in the trend can be better noticed if we 
restrict the series to the 2015Q1–2018Q4 period as in graph 8 below. 
There are two evident different periods in the chart. Between 2015 and 2016, the gap 
tends to zero. This means that the synthetic was good in capturing the movement in the 
actual consumption. We might say that the co–movement between the two series was 
high. The widening of the gap between the actual consumption and the one that would 
have arose had the Brexit vote not been held is clear from 2017 on. The gap seems to be 
growing over time, presumably until a Brexit agreement is signed and uncertainty 
vanishes. As the statistical significance is difficult to test in causal inference, a one 
Graph 7: Actual and synthetic consumption series for 1995Q1 – 2018Q4, relative to 1995Q1 
   
 
22 | P a g e  
 
standard deviation band is included around the series. This can help us understand that 
the gap is significant when both bands do not overlap anymore. This happens 
approximately around the last quarter of 2017, a year after the vote.  
 
The magnitude of the gap with respect to the should be scenario is displayed in numbers 
in Table 4 and graphically in the following chart 9.  
 
As mentioned above, goodness of fit for the consumption is not as good as for the 
output. Consumption is much more volatile than output, although less than other 
Table 4: consumption gaps 
Table 4: consumption gaps in percentage points and gross quantities 
Quarter % Period gap Quarter % Period gap 
2016–Q3 0.73 1194440 2017–Q4 -1.12 -18794.85 
2016–Q4 -0.12 -1979.63 2018–Q1 -1.38 -23361.78 
2017–Q1 0.23 3888.15 2018–Q2 -1.74 -29578.43 
2017–Q2 -0.31 -5079.65 2018–Q3 -2.09 -35596.85 
2017–Q3 -0.67 -11251.99 2018–Q4 -2.53 -43191.35 
Graph 8: Actual and synthetic consumption series for 2015Q1 – 2018Q4, relative to 1995Q1 
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variables as investment or exports. This leads to more regular gaps, and of bigger 
magnitude. The large goodness of fit gap in 2010 can be observed in the second half of 
the graph. However, if we choose to omit that event, the widening of the gap as a 
consequence of the Brexit vote is clear. Except for the aforementioned 2010 difference, 
the consumption gap in our estimation does not exceed the ± 1.5% barrier. The mean 
gap for the 1995Q1–2016Q2 period is +0.07%, while the standard deviation is 0.7338. 
After the Brexit vote, one year is enough for the gap to exceed the –1.5% bound. It does 
even go further, as it is displayed in Table 4. For the post–treatment period, the mean 
gap escalates to a value of –0.9%, 12 times the pre–treatment mean. The standard 
deviation for that very same period is 1.0568, signaling that the volatility of the 
consumption has grown after the referendum. As the two periods compared are not 
equal in size, we must wait some more quarters to check whether consumption has 
indeed suffered a severe slowdown or if the widening of the gap is a temporary situation 
due to the uncertainty.  
 
Table 4 gathers the consumption gap evolution in numbers. Actual and synthetic 
consumption start departing one from another at some point in 2017. By the end of that 
year, the gap breaks the 1% mark, with an accumulated loss of consumption of 18.79 
Graph 9: Actual vs synthetic consumption gap in percentage, whole series 
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billion dollars, or almost 15000 million pounds. The difference accelerated in 2018, to 
exceed the 2% bound halfway through that year. The last data available generates a 
consumption gap of 2.53%, which in monetary terms would mean a loss of 43.191 
billion dollars, or more than 34000 million pounds. This quantity would amount to a 
42.68% of the whole loss for the output in the United Kingdom estimated in section 3, 
or a 1.3% loss of the output. It is equivalent to a £261 million weekly loss in 
consumption with respect to the no Brexit vote hypothetical situation. In other words, 
each British citizen would have already lost £511.38 in consumption as an effect of 
Brexit, or £1.789,75 for every household. These figures can be easily compared to the 
situation prior to the Brexit vote. As estimated by the StrongerIn referendum campaign, 
every household used to contribute with  £340 annually, compared to the estimated 
£3000 that they received in exchange.
25
  
Even though the existence of an impact on consumption has already been analysed, the 
conveyor belt through which the Brexit vote is affecting families’ decisions is still to be 
untangled. Breinlich et al. (2017) firstly addressed the impact of the vote on the British 
households’ living standards mainly via the CPI inflation26 and the depreciation of the 
pound.  
For that purpose, they compare in the first place the actual CPI inflation in the United 
Kingdom with that from other European countries for the 2015–2017 period. They 
conclude that the CPI from the UK has consistently departed from the CPI for the rest 
of the countries since the Brexit vote.  
With more data available, the conclusions from that paper will be checked for the whole 
1995–2018 period via the synthetic control method. If inflation has indeed been affected 
by the Brexit vote, then the loss of consumption previously found could be due to this 
erosion of British families’ purchasing power. Consumption might be at a standstill 
because real wages are falling as a consequence of growing unexpected inflation and 
stagnant nominal wages. Following the previously explained estimation technique, we 
construct a synthetic series for the CPI inflation of the United Kingdom. The two series 
are displayed in the following graphs:  
                                                             
25 See in: https://www.strongerin.co.uk/economy#CSbmZrfbvdYglzH2.97 
26 Consumer Price Index inflation. 
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The goodness of fit from 1995 to 2016 is good enough to trust the causal effects of the 
Brexit vote in the inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index. From 2016Q3 on, 
we observe a widening gap between the observed inflation and the hypothetical one, had 
the Brexit vote not happened. The size of the gap is better understood if we restrict the 
chart to the 2015–2018 period, as in graph 11.  
Until the Brexit vote, the gap between the actual CPI inflation for the United Kingdom 
and the synthetic CPI regularly oscilated between ±1%. In 2016Q3, the trend is broken, 
and inflation escalates up to a 2%. As for the inflation rate of the United Kingdom,
27
 it 
got from 0.5% in June 2016 up to 3% by the end of 2017. Since then, it dropped to the 
2% mark, where it has remained until now.
28
 This inflation raise is estimated in 
Breinlich et al. (2017) to have costed around £408 per year to British households, the 
equivalent of 56% of the total consumption loss of £1.789,75 that was estimated 
above.
29
 They do also refer to the fact that the inflation raise, together with the nominal 
wages being constant, has led to British workers losing as much as a week’s pay 
because of the fall in real wages. 
                                                             
27 Calculated as the variation in the CPIs between periods. 
28 See the inflation evolution in: https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/inflation-cpi 
29 Breinlich et al. (2017), pp. 2 
Graph 10: UK real CPI inflation and synthetic CPI, 2015 = 100 
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Graph 12: UK real CPI inflation and synthetic CPI, 2015-2018 period, 2015 = 100 
Graph 11: UK actual CPI and synthetic CPI gap, in percentage of the actual CPI inflation 
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Secondly, Breinlich et al. (2017) turn their attention to the depreciation of the pound in 
order to explain the raise in inflation, and hence, the gap in consumption. They isolate 
the different products in a usual consumption basket (through which the CPI is 
calculated) by their import shares. If inflation was indeed a consequence of the 
depreciation of the pound, two differentiated effects should be observable in the 
consumption basket. Those goods and services with higher external exposure should 
suffer higher inflation, because the fact of imports becoming more expensive makes 
those products more expensive too. On the contrary, those goods mainly produced in the 
United Kingdom should have faced lower inflation rates. Dividing all the goods and 
services into high exposure and low exposure categories, they find a clear break in the 
tendency around the Brexit vote.
30
 Until 2016Q3, both series had oscillated around zero, 
as it was a period of low inflation. However, high import exposure products’ prices 
started rising after the vote, reaching a maximum of an almost 6% inflation in the midst 
of 2017. Low import exposure products, meanwhile, had an inflation of around 0–2% 
for the same period. This study provides robust proof that the consumption loss of the 
British households is derived from the immediate depreciation of currency that 
succeeded the vote: those goods and services that have faced the higher inflation peaks 
(those with higher import exposure) are the most usual ones in the common British 
consumption basket.
31
  
 
3.3. Investment 
 
Investment has historically had a significant weight on the national income of the 
United Kingdom.  Investment in the British economy was 17.22% of the GDP in 
2018Q1,
32
 down from the maximum levels observed some decades ago. The 
tertiarisation of the British economy, particularly since the boom of financial and other 
services in the 80s, has pushed investment down. However, some manufacturing sectors 
                                                             
30 Breinlich et al. (2017), pp. 7 
31 Such as Bread and cereals, Milk, cheese and eggs, Coffee, tea and cocoa, Beer, Wine, Furniture and 
furnishings. See the entire list in: Breinlich et al. (2017), pp. 8 
32 See the evolution of investment in: IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics, UK, National 
Accounts 
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are still very intensive in capital investment. Additionally, foreign direct investment
33
 is 
a crucial part of British investment. For the last data available, in 2017 inward FDI 
reached up to £1336.5 billion, a 4.6% of the UK GDP,
34
 while outward FDI was 
£1,313.3 billion, leaving a slightly negative net FDI investment position.
35
  The impact 
of Brexit on domestic investment will be analysed in the first place, with the foreign 
direct investment coming next.  
Since investment requires medium– and long–term decisions, uncertainty about the 
future condition of the economy tends to increase volatility. This particular feature of 
investment will complicate the analysis of the impact of the Brexit vote in it, as it 
quickly reacts to uncertainty, announced interest rate changes and future economic 
prospects. Additionally, we should take into account that foreign direct investment is 
even more volatile as the national one. All these will lead to a non–smooth evolution of 
investment that will certainly hurt the accuracy of the synthetic control.  
The impact of the Brexit vote in the investment will be addressed by applying the 
synthetic control method set forth in section 3 of this article. We will use the gross fixed 
capital formation
36
 data for the 1995Q1–2018Q4 period as a proxy for investment. The 
same 30 countries are chosen for the analysis. As in the previous cases, we set the value 
of 1995Q1 to 1 and normalise the rest of values with respect to that one. This particular 
measurement of the investment will yield a better goodness of fit than the gross 
quantities or the proportion of investment of the GDP. We construct a synthetic 
investment by minimizing the distance between the British and the donor pool 
countries’ GFCF for the pre–treatment period. The countries with largest contributions 
to the prediction of investment in the United Kingdom are assigned bigger weights.  
Those weights obtained from the algorithm that gives the optimal solution are displayed 
in Table 5 below. As expected, countries with similar economic frameworks better help 
increase the goodness of fit for the United Kingdom, such as  Germany, Japan, New 
                                                             
33 Usually shortened as FDI 
34 World Bank Databank, World Development Indicators, Foreign Direct Inflows, % of GDP 
35 Detailed data on UK foreign investment can be found in: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/foreigndirectinvest
mentinvolvingukcompanies/2017 
36 Official definition by the NBER: The Gross Fixed Capital Formation, or GFCF, is a measure of investment 
included in the expenditure measurement of GDP. It is calculated by substracting the disposals to the 
adquisitions of fixed assets by firms, the government or households. In this sense, it is a good 
approximation of the investment in the national firms.  
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Zealand or Switzerland. There are also minor contributions from Estonia, Hungary, 
Spain and the United States.  
Table 5: country weights for the synthetic investment 
Australia <0.01 Greece <0.01 Netherlands <0.01 
Austria <0.01 Hungary  0.06 
 
New Zealand  0.10 
 
Belgium <0.01 Iceland <0.01 Norway <0.01 
Canada <0.01 Ireland <0.01 Portugal <0.01 
Chile <0.01 Israel <0.01 Slovak Republic <0.01 
Czech Republic <0.01 Italy <0.01 Spain  0.05 
 
Estonia   0.02 
 
Japan  0.31 
 
Sweden <0.01 
Finland <0.01 Korea <0.01 Switzerland  0.16 
 
France <0.01 Luxembourg <0.01 United States  0.06 
 
Germany  0.23 
 
Mexico <0.01   
Table 5: country weights for investment 
Once we have the optimal weights, we can construct the synthetic as explained before: 
for each period, we multiply the weights by the investment data for each country. We 
then display both the actual investment series for the United Kingdom and the 
counterfactual in the following graph 13.   
Unsurprisingly, the synthetic counterfactual fails to fit the investment at many periods, 
due to the great volatility of it. However, this find doesn’t completely discard the 
possibility of reaching some interesting conclusions. Big gaps against the actual 
investment suggest negative shocks, while big gaps in favour mean positive ones. 
Taking this into account, a significant gap can be observed some quarters after the 
Brexit vote. This difference between the series is better understood if include the time 
evolution of the gaps. 
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Gaps tend to be large across the time series. There are some peaks that almost reach the 
10% difference, although the gap is usually between ±5%. After the Brexit vote, the 
Graph 14: UK actual investment and synthetic counterfactual measured by the GFCF, relative 
to 1995Q1 
Graph 13: UK actual investment and synthetic counterfactual gaps, in percentage points 
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investment gap is clearly widening, well over the –7% lower–bound. That downturn 
would mean an estimate of $21,85 billions, or 17,43 billion pounds.  Nevertheless, we 
couldn’t conclude whether this investment loss with respect to the hypothetical no vote 
scenario is attributable to the vote itself or other underlying reasons. This comes from 
the poor goodness of fit that we observe.  
We then revise some related literature so as to determine whether after the Brexit vote 
there’s been a negative impact on investment or not. There is not much work done on 
British domestic investment, due to the complexity of isolating the Brexit vote effect 
from other effects. Notwithstanding that, many papers have focused in the impact on 
outward and inward investment flows, much more affected by uncertainty and 
anticipation effects. We divide the analysis into two parts: firstly, the investment of 
British firms abroad; then, the foreign direct investment in British soil.  
Breinlich et al. (2019)
37
 apply the synthetic control methods to establish whether there’s 
already been a capital flight in the United Kingdom. Indeed, they find that both British 
firms and international companies set up in British land have started to move some of 
their activities to other European or American countries. Hence, they would be 
anticipating the future barriers to their activity once Brexit is implemented and thus, 
moving to EU Member States to avoid trade or regulatory frictions.  They estimate that 
the Brexit vote has led to a 12% increase in British firms’ investment in EU countries 
by the beginning of 2019, fundamentally in the service sector.
38
 In numbers, this 
increase would amount to £8.3 billion, which would probably have been invested 
domestically had the Brexit vote not happened. This capital flight could be partly 
behind the drop in investment that we accounted for in our synthetic trial.  
At the same time, Breinlich et al. (2019) do also investigate the EU investments in the 
United Kingdom. If Brexit would mean the construction of a tall wall between the UK 
and Europe neighbours, it is to expect that European companies wouldn’t want to risk 
by investing in British soil. Actually, they find a 11% drop in EU investments on the 
other side of the English Channel, amounting to £3.5 billions. This lessening in 
investment has probably slowed the jobs creation and general activity in the UK. The 
                                                             
37 Holger Breinlich, Elsa Leromain, Dennis Novy and Thomas Sampson (2019). Voting with their Money: 
Brexit and Outward Investment by UK Firms. CEP Brexit Analysis No. 13. London School of Economics 
and Political Science. 
38 Principally from the financial sector and its complementary services, which will be briefly addressed in 
section 4.6. 
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conclusions reached in this paper are consistent with the observed data from the UK 
Office for National Statistics, which has already noticed an abrupt slowdown in EU 
investments in the UK, together with some acceleration in the outward investments.
39
 
 
3.4. Balance of trade 
 
Trade is one of the riskiest and yet most important issues regarding Brexit. Firstly, it is 
relevant because of its significant contribution to the output of the United Kingdom. 
That country has always been very closely related to trade, and it still is. In 2016, 
exports were a 30.53% of the GDP, while imports were at 31.43%.
40
 An estimate of 8% 
of all British enterprises sold goods and services abroad for the same period, including 
the big exporting companies that employ tens of thousands of workers.
41
 That number 
would certainly and significantly grow if we accounted for all the companies that import 
intermediate consumption goods and services.  
Second, trade between the United Kingdom and its neighbouring countries rose to a 
47% of all exports in 2017, with the remaining 53% being with the rest of the world.
42
 
In 2017, the UK exported to the EU £274 billion worth goods and services, while they 
imported for a value of £341 billion. In consequence, the United Kingdom runs a trade 
deficit with their continental counterparts, which could clearly be affected after Brexit.  
More important, according to a report by the Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills of the British government, of the 8% of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
that export their products or services, 82% of them did so to the European Union.
43
 If no 
supplementary agreement were reached after the Brexit and tariffs were imposed on 
British exports, those SMEs would be the most affected.  
                                                             
39 Foreign direct investment involving UK companies: 2017. Office for National Statistics. See the 
complete document in: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/foreigndirectinvest
mentinvolvingukcompanies/2017 
40 ONS Balance of Payments Dataset. 
41 ONS Annual Businness Survey (ABS) 
42 ONS Balance of Payments Dataset: Exports, European Union and Exports: Total Trade in Goods & 
Services. 
43 BIS estimate of the proportion of UK SMEs in the supply chain of exporters, May 2016 
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Thirdly, the estimate for the exports of EU countries in global terms ranges from 8% to 
18% of total exports, making the United Kingdom its second trading partner, only 
behind the United States, and inmediately ahead of China.
44
 For some European 
countries, like Ireland, the United Kingdom is the main trade partner when it comes to 
imports. For others, like Germany or Spain, the UK represents a major part in the 
exports. In consequence, any trade shock that affected the British trade sector would 
certainly hurt the economies of some European countries too. 
Fourth, and last, the trade shock derived from the rupture of UK–EU relations will 
completely depend on the deal that is finally signed. On the one hand, should the UK 
decide to remain being a participant in the EU Single Market by applying to be a 
member of EFTA,
45
 then trade wouldn’t suffer many frictions, at least in the medium– 
and long–run. On the other hand, if the country negotiated to leave the EU with no deal 
at all, thus instantly loosing access to EU customers, trade would probably suffer a 
devastating effect. Even with negotiations open with third countries, the effect of trade 
barriers imposed on many products could be devastating for the service sector and many 
export–oriented manufacturing companies.  
To capture the possible short–run effect of the Brexit vote on the balance of trade, we 
fulfill two separate analysis’ for the UK exports and imports. Due to the depreciation of 
the British pound, we expect some effect to be observable. The method that we use is 
the same as previously: the synthetic control. We skip the methodological part and jump 
directly to the graphical results for simplification purposes. 
As expected, goodness of fit for both the imports and the exports is not good enough to 
yield reliable conclusions. However, there are some features of the series than must be 
noted. The depreciation of the pound that was mentioned above might have changed the 
trade dynamics for the United Kingdom, although not very significantly. The 
depreciation must have made exports more competitive, as foreign companies find it 
now cheaper buying from British firms; imports, in the meantime, have increased their 
price, because buying from foreign countries is now more expensive.  
 
                                                             
44 European Commission Trade Helpdesk (2018) 
45 European Free Trade Agreement: regional free trade agreement area consisting of Iceland, Norway, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland, which, not being part of the European Union, closely colaborate with it 
through their external participation in the Single Market or the Schengen Area. 
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If we observe the evolution of exports, there is a small gap around 2017. The gap is 
negative, which means that the synthetic predicts higher exports than they actually were. 
Those countries in the donor pool were steady in exports at that time, but those in the 
United Kingdom suffered a minor decrease. Up to 2018, the gap seems to have closed 
Graph 15: UK actual and synthetic imports, relative to 1995Q1 
 
Graph 16: UK actual and synthetic exports, relative to 1995Q1 
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again. It must be noted that the poor quality of the goodness of fit might invalidate this 
result, as similar gaps are observable through the whole series. This could indicate that 
the gap might come from problems with the fit, and not from the Brexit vote itself. 
Imports, however, do not seem to have significantly diverged from the synthetic 
counterfactual. Although there is a small gap after the vote, both series then come to 
converge again. As we can’t decompose the imports into different categories of 
products, we can’t determine whether imports have been affected by the referendum.  
Both exports and imports are certainly going to be affected by the breakup from the EU, 
but currently, there are no signs of trade frictions due to the uncertainty or anticipation 
from the vote.
46
   
 
3.5. Public expenditure 
 
In the last five years, the British different governmental authorities’ public expenditure 
has consistenly remained around a 38% of the GDP.
47
 Prior to the Brexit vote, the 
budget deficit in the United Kingdom was closing at a steady path, due to increasing tax 
revenues.
48
 This allowed the government to allocate more resources to the NHS or local 
authorities. However, it is likely that consumption and investment gaps shown in 
previous sections might have already affected the financial stability of the budget.  
We analyse the impact of Brexit by following the same procedure as before. We obtain 
data for public expenditure for the 1995Q1–2018Q4 period for the same 30 donor 
countries plus the United Kingdom. We then construct our counterfactual public 
expenditure with the optimal weights that are enlisted below: 
 
                                                             
46 (Dhingra, 2017) 
47 It accounts for an 18% of the aggregate demand (or GDP via the expenditure approach) for the same 
period, making it the second component after private consumption. Data from the UK Office for 
National Statistics. See in: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/bulletins/publ
icsectorfinances/december2018#links-to-data-and-related-publications 
 
48 Springford, J. (2019). The cost of Brexit to september 2018. Centre for European Reform.  
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Table 6: country weights for the synthetic public expenditure 
Australia <0.01 Greece  0.09 
 
Netherlands <0.01 
Austria <0.01 Hungary  0.24 
 
New Zealand <0.01 
Belgium <0.01 Iceland <0.01 Norway <0.01 
Canada  0.09 
 
Ireland  0.02 
 
Portugal  0.13 
 
Chile <0.01 Israel <0.01 Slovak Republic <0.01 
Czech Republic <0.01 Italy <0.01 Spain  0.06 
 
Estonia   0.11 
 
Japan <0.01 Sweden <0.01 
Finland <0.01 Korea <0.01 Switzerland <0.01 
France <0.01 Luxembourg  0.25 
 
United States <0.01 
Table 6: country weights for public expenditure 
The actual public expenditure and the synthetic counterfactual are compared in graph 
15. Goodness of fit is quite good for the pre–treatment period, so the conclusions that 
we will obtain can be trusted as consistent. Public expenditure doesn’t suffer major 
changes, until the gap clearly widens from 2015 on. The gap starts some quarters before 
the vote is actually held. That fact could be attributable to the government preparing its 
finances for a possible Brexit result in the vote that was about to be held the following 
year.  
The widening gap is easily noticeable in graph 16. Up to the Brexit vote, the gap had 
never been higher than 3% in both directions. After the referendum, though, the real 
public expenditure for the United Kingdom falls behind the hypothetical counterfactual. 
The numbers of this gap are computed and enlisted in Table 7.  
By the middle of 2017, the gap had already surpassed the 3% bound. One year later, the 
gap was well over 4%, and increasing. At the end of 2018, for the last available data we 
have for the analysis, the gap ascended to 4.92%, or 25,21 billion pounds of difference. 
There has been a notorious slowdown in the public expenditure. However, the source 
for that downturn is still to be determined. Although the Brexit vote poses a great 
candidate, there might be other reasons behind it. 
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Graph 18: UK actual and synthetic public expenditure, relative to 1995Q1 
Graph 17: UK actual and synthetic public expenditure gap in percentage points 
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The British government’s 2018 “EU Exit: Long–term economic analysis” report gives 
some clues about the evolution of public expenditure for the following budget periods.
49
 
The depreciation of the pound, the inflation spike or the investment relocations are 
regarded as responsible for some downgrade in the tax revenues prospects for the next 
years. Calculus from the Treasury and the Exchequer from the UK used to predict a 
closing of the budget deficit for the 2016–2017 period, coming from the rise in tax 
collection. However, borrowing has grown again after the vote. The Treasury obtained 
in its study a relation of £7.6 billion of extra borrowing for every 1% that the output 
falls. Springford (2019) estimates that the referendum is already costing around 320 
million pounds a week to the British Treasury from higher borrowing. According to our 
estimate for output loss of 3%, the extra borrowing attributable to the Brexit vote would 
amount to more than £22,8 billion, not far from the £25 billion loss in public 
expenditure obtained above. The extra borrowing could increase the service of debt 
budget allocation, even more if the Bank of England increases the interest rate to fight 
against the rising inflation.  
Additionally, preparation for the Brexit deliverance has meant importance changes in 
the UK Budget, which could hurt the total expenditure
50
. The 2017–2018 Budget 
                                                             
49 See in: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/76
0484/28_November_EU_Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf 
50 Summary: Costing Brexit (2018). Institute for Government. See in:  
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/summary-costing-brexit 
Table 7: Public expenditure gaps in percentage points and gross quantities 
Quarter % Period gap Quarter % Period gap 
2016–Q3 -1.22 -6211.09 2017–Q4 -4.31 -21858.22 
2016–Q4 -1.08 -5463.45 2018–Q1 -3.82 -19447.78 
2017–Q1 -2.27 -11425.47 2018–Q2 -4.43 -22408.39 
2017–Q2 -2.76 -14001.23 2018–Q3 -5.42 -27406.84 
2017–Q3 -3.58 -18182.04 2018–Q4 -4.92 -25210.58 
Table 7: public expenditure gaps 
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included a £3 billion contingency fund for the following two years. This money was 
supposed to be employed to counterbalance the short–term effects of Brexit. What’s 
more, two new departments have been created under the framework of the British 
government to deal with Brexit itself: the Department for Exiting the European Union 
and the Department for International Trade. Existing departments have reallocated some 
of their funds for future need, too. 
Lastly, the fall in public expenditure could be a conscious decision by the British 
government to avoid future financial problems. Predictions from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer are pessimistic about the future state of the economy.
51
 Consumption and 
investment are expected to decline even faster once the final deal (or no deal) is 
reached. Trade will certainly depend on the type of deal, but it will surely have some 
impact on the British industry and services. If these expectations are fulfilled, tax 
revenues might steeply fall, and public expenditure could increase from unemployment 
benefits, service of debt or unexpected costs of Brexit. To soften this hypothetical 
situation, the British government might already be adjusting the Budget in consequence.  
Therefore, the obtained gap in public expenditure could come from the fact that the vote 
has moderately hurt the taxation system, leading to higher borrowing, and hence, to the 
necessity of budget cuts to maintain the deficit under control. From other perspective, 
the gap could be due to the goodness of fit needed to counteract future negative effects 
from Brexit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
51 Chancellery of the Exchequer (2018). EU Exit: Long–term economic analysis. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
When the Brexit vote was implemented, little was known about the possible economic 
consequences that it could arise, apart from more or less accurate predictions and 
forecasts. As the Brexit was an event that had never happened before, barely was 
understood about the aftermath of the process of disintegration. 
Today, around three years after the referendum and with some months still to go until 
the deadline on 31
st
 October 2019, data provides us with some results of interest
52
. Up 
to the last quarter of 2018, the Gross Domestic Product of the United Kingdom is 
estimated to have suffered a loss of more than 3% with respect to its business-as-usual 
scenario, had the Brexit vote not been carried out. This expected loss might have come 
both from the uncertainty about the future relation between the UK and the EU, as well 
as from the anticipation of rational economic agents, who might already be preparing 
for the worst possible scenario.  
Once the gap of the GDP is computed, we look for the underlying causes behind it. 
Using the components of the National Accounts, we estimate that consumption amounts 
to as much as 42% of the GDP loss. Although families or households increasing their 
savings could be the reason for this slowdown in consumption, we find some consistent 
proof regarding the effect of the spike in inflation on consumption. The devaluation of 
the British pound has provoked inflation to rise, which has significantly hurt the 
purchasing power of households.  
Investment is also an important component when it comes to explaining the GDP loss. 
We find some evidence of British firms investing less, though the results are not as 
consistent as for consumption. In addition, we gather some academic work about the 
increase in investment of British firms in the EU soil, while foreign direct investment 
might have fallen in British land. 
Regarding trade, we don’t find any effect of the vote neither on exports nor in imports. 
As negotiations about the future trade relationship of the UK and the EU are still being 
                                                             
52 The United Kingdom was initially supposed to be leaving the European Union on March 29th 2019, but 
the British Government applied for an extension until autumn, as no satisfying deal had been yet 
reached. 
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carried out, this result is consistent. We expect the balance of trade to change once the 
Brexit is fulfilled.  
Public expenditure has suffered an important change in its trend after the vote, with a 
loss of around 5% with respect to the no–Brexit scenario. The fall in tax revenues due to 
consumption and investment losses might be behind this find. The British Government 
adjusting its Budget to be able to cope with a reccession in a near future or the increase 
in the debt might also be argued as plausible reasons.  
In short, the British economy is already being hurt by the vote that took the country of 
the European Union, where it had belonged for many decades. Further analysis should 
be carried out in a near future, once the conditions on the agreement are clear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
42 | P a g e  
 
5. References 
 
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study 
of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), 113-132. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic Control Methods for 
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco 
Control Program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490). 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2012). Comparative Politics and the 
Synthetic Control Method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2). 
Blanchard, O., L`Huillier, J.-P., & Lorenzoni, G. (2013). News, noise and fluctuations: 
an empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 103(7), 3045-70. 
Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica, 77(3), 623-685. 
Born, B., Müller, G., Schularick, M., & Sedlácek, P. (2017). The Economic 
Consequences of the Brexit Vote. CESifo Working Papers(6780). 
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., & Sampson, T. (2019). The Brexit Vote, 
Inflation and UK Living Standards. CEP Brexit Analysis Papers(11). 
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., & Sampson, T. (2019). Voting with their Money: 
Brexit and Outward Investment by UK Firms. CEP Brexit Analysis Papers(13). 
Campos, N. F. (2019). B for Brexit: A Survey of the Economics Academic Literature. 
IZA Discussion Papers(12134). 
Campos, N. F., Coricelli, F., & Moretti, L. (2014). Economic Growth and Political 
Integration: Estimating the Benefits from Membership in the European Union 
Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method. IZA Discussion Paper 
Series(8162). 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. (2016). UK SMEs in the supply chains of 
exporters: methodology note.  
Dhingra, S. (2017). The costs and benefits of leaving the EU: trade effects. Economic 
Policy, 32(92), 651-705. 
European Commission. (2018). Trade Helpdesk Report.  
Fuchs-Schüdeln, N., & Tarek, H. (2016). Natural experiments in macroeconomics. The 
Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2, 923-1012. 
HM Treasury of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. (2018). EU Exit: Long-term 
economic analysis.  
   
 
43 | P a g e  
 
HM Treasury of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. (2018). HM Treasury Budget. 
Institute for Government. (2018). Summary: Costing Brexit. IfG Insights. 
Kee, H. L., & Nicita, A. (2017). Short-Term Impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom’s 
Export of Goods. (W. B. Team, Ed.) Policy Research Working Papers(8195). 
Office for National Statistics. (2017). ONS Annual Business Survey (ABS).  
Sampson, T. (2017). Brexit: the Economics of International Disintegration. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 31(4), 163-184. 
Springford, J. (2019). The cost of Brexit to September 2018. Centre for European 
Reform. 
 
 
 
